AP 502(L) - WWI Airpower Application

OVERVIEW

When World War I erupted in Europe in 1914, heavier-than-air flight was barely a decade old, and had been used in very few military operations. However, it quickly became a vital component to strategy in the First World War, and an indispensable aspect of military operations, particularly on the Western Front. By the end of the war, airpower had been used in virtually every role that it fulfills in modern applications, albeit in a much more primitive fashion. This lecture provides a broad overview of the first significant attempts to use military airpower, and demonstrates how important airpower was in the development and employment of strategy during the war.

NO SOBs.

Lecture notes

 1)        Main ideas in the lecture

 a)         What is airpower?

 b)        How is airpower effective?

 c)         Emphasis on the Western Front

 d)        Frontline/tactical airpower

 e)         Airpower and the strategic outcome

 2)        Contexts of Effectiveness

 a)         UK/France Economy and policy

 i)         Quantitative advantage in human, material and fiscal resources

 ii)        Larger industrial base; easier access to foreign credit

 iii)      Effective mobilization of war economy

 iv)       Political imperative: expel German forces from France/Belgium

 v)        Overall military strategy is predominantly offensive

 b)        German economy and policy

 i)         Limited human, material, fiscal resources

 ii)        Shortages of raw materials

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      Problems of economic mobilization

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       Basic strategy is to hold line in the West and seek opportunities in Eastern Europe

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> c)         Airpower structures and manpower

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Quite small in scope and scale

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       French air service is only 3.5% of French Army in 1918

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Rapid wartime expansion

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      High manpower requirements, ground support, maintenance

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       All organizations subordinate to ground forces

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> d)        Rapid technology innovation during the war

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Aircraft speeds double, max ceilings

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Horsepower quadrupled

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      At least 4 generations of fighter aircraft introduced

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       Standardized aircraft production—previously very craft industry

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> e)         Ideas

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Technology is outpacing the doctrine

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Low performance made mass a key tactical/operational tenet

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      French/British much more offensive-minded, Germans more defensive

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> f)          Nature of combat in the air

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Resource-intensive nature of air ops – high turnover of manpower and aircraft

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Very high casualty rates – France 40%, Germany 40%, UK 51%

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      Escalating intensity of air operations

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       71% of French casualties are sustained in the last 6 months of the war

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.25in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level1lfo1"> 3)        Harnessing Airpower

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> a)         Airpower-artillery nexus

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         First Battle of the Marne (Sep 1914)

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       Air recon is used for strategic effect

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       Cavalry can’t do recon due to trenches, so airpower takes that role

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        “Artillery conquers, infantry occupies”

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      Recon emerges as a specialized airpower function, photo mapping

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       Specialized tactics, TTPs, platforms, people

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> b)        Air superiority (AS)

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Direct consequence of importance of aerial ISR

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Emergence of specialized fighter platforms, units, tactics

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      First real fighter: the Fokker E. 1 (Eindecker) in Aug 1915

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       Contest for AS drives technology and tactics innovation

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> v)        Involves massed aircraft, very attritional

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> c)         Birth of the Air Campaign: Battle of Verdun 1916

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         German emphasis on local AS to support ground advance

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Charles Tricornot de Rose and the French air campaign

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       Unified command

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       AS as clearly stated aim

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (3)       “Seek out enemy, fight him, and destroy him”

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      Lessons of Verdun

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       Nothing is possible w/o air superiority

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       Offensive orientation and massed aircraft key to AS

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (3)       Hugh Trenchard and the RFC on the Somme – “Relentless and incessant offensive”

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (4)       Specialized fighter units and unified command structures

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> d)        Airpower and the Combined-Arms battle in 1918

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         German operation Michael, March 1918 aimed at British/French hinge in N France

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       Airpower central to planning and execution

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       ISR, CAS, AI

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (3)       Airpower limits: weather, a/c performance

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Airpower in Allies’ “Hundred Days” Offensive

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       AS provides intelligence and surprise

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       AS prevents Germans from gaining intel, seeing massed infantry coming

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (3)       Continued improvement of air-artillery coordination

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iii)      Combined-arms battle key to ending Western front war in 1918

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> iv)       Overwhelming Allied numerical superiority in air

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (1)       Germany: 2,200 aircraft

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (2)       France: 3,700

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (3)       UK: 2,600

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:1.0in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level4lfo1"> (4)       US: 740

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.25in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level1lfo1"> 4)        Legacies of this war

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> a)         AS is significant, but not decisive

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> b)        All basic airpower functions, roles, missions in evidence

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> c)         Showed effectiveness of force multiplier for ground element

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> d)        Airpower written into Armistice (Nov 1918) and Treaty of Versailles (1919)

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> e)         “Command of the Air”

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> f)          Cultural uniqueness of air services

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.25in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level1lfo1"> 5)        So what?

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> a)         WWI shows that airpower is holistic

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Industrial capacity to support aircraft manufacturing

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> ii)        Support infrastructure

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> b)        Quantity has a quality all its own

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="margin-left:.75in;mso-add-space: auto;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level3lfo1"> i)         Number imbalance between Allies and German

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpMiddle" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> c)         Doctrine still lags behind technology innovation

<p class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0level2lfo1"> d)        War as a learning contest